Africa’s democratic crisis is not caused only by military coups. Some of the continent’s most damaging assaults on democratic succession occur inside parliaments, constitutional courts and carefully managed referendums. Elected presidents remove term limits, restart the presidential clock and reshape succession rules to remain in power. A constitution should restrain those who govern. When its provisions are repeatedly tailored to the incumbent, it becomes an instrument of personal rule.
Cameroon’s President Paul Biya illustrates the danger. He has governed since 1982, and presidential term limits were abolished in 2008. On 27 October 2025, the Constitutional Council declared him the winner of an eighth term with 53.66 percent of the vote. Opposition challenger Issa Tchiroma Bakary disputed the result, while the government rejected accusations of irregularities. Biya was 92 at the election; another seven-year term could keep him in office until nearly 100.
Cameroon’s succession debate has since taken a troubling turn. In April 2026, Parliament approved the reintroduction of a vice presidency whose holder would be appointed and dismissed by the president. The appointee would take over for the remainder of the presidential term if the presidency became vacant through death, resignation or incapacity. Supporters presented the reform as a guarantee of institutional continuity; opponents warned that it strengthened presidential control over succession.
One important distinction must be made. The widely circulated claim that Biya appointed his son, Franck Emmanuel Biya, as vice president was based on a fabricated decree. AFP’s fact-check, published on 17 April 2026, found the document fake and reported official denials that such an appointment had occurred. That alleged appointment cannot responsibly be presented as an established fact.
The verified reform nevertheless warrants strong criticism. Allowing a president who has ruled for more than four decades to choose the person who could inherit the remainder of his mandate concentrates an extraordinary decision in one individual’s hands. It creates an opening for succession managed by the incumbent rather than a fresh choice by citizens. Whether the appointee is a relative or a trusted ally, the democratic question remains the same: who should determine the next national leader?
Biya and his family do not own Cameroon. No presidential family owns the country it governs, and public office cannot legitimately be treated as an estate to be passed down. The possibility of dynastic succession deserves scrutiny, but criticism must rest on verified actions. The constitutional change is serious enough to challenge without relying on a false decree.
The question is therefore larger than whether Biya’s continued rule is technically permitted under an amended constitution. Does a constitutional system retain democratic legitimacy when it is repeatedly redesigned around the political survival and succession preferences of the same leader?
Equatorial Guinea provides a documented example of a presidential son becoming vice president. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has ruled since overthrowing his uncle in 1979. A 2011 constitutional reform introduced two seven-year presidential terms and removed the age ceiling, but the term limits took effect with the 2016 election rather than counting his earlier decades in office. In 2016, he appointed his son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, vice president. The reform left the incumbent able to continue governing while the appointment raised the prospect of family succession.
Uganda offers another lesson. Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986. Presidential term limits were removed in 2005, and the constitutional age ceiling was removed in 2017. Each change eliminated a barrier to his continued candidacy. On 12 May 2026, he was sworn in for a seventh elected term, extending his presidency into a fifth decade. A nation’s capacity to renew its leadership should not depend on whether its incumbent agrees to leave.
In the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso ruled from 1979 to 1992 and returned to power in 1997. The 2015 constitutional overhaul removed restrictions that would otherwise have prevented another candidacy. In March 2026, he was declared re-elected with 94.82 percent of the vote. Major opposition parties declined to field candidates, citing inadequate transparency, while prominent opposition figures remained imprisoned. Such conditions demand scrutiny of electoral competition, not admiration for the size of the official winning margin.
Rwanda’s Paul Kagame has been president since 2000 and is widely credited with helping rebuild the country after the genocide. Those achievements should strengthen the case for durable institutions and orderly succession. The 2015 constitutional amendments made a special exception permitting another seven-year term, followed by two five-year terms, potentially keeping him in office until 2034. Development cannot justify making a single president appear indispensable.
Togo demonstrates how power can be prolonged by changing the office through which it is exercised. Faure Gnassingbé succeeded his father in 2005, continuing a family hold on power dating to 1967. Following the 2024 constitutional changes, he became president of the Council of Ministers in May 2025. This powerful executive office has renewable six-year terms without a limit on renewals, while the national presidency is largely ceremonial. Parliamentary government is a legitimate democratic model; its introduction becomes troubling when it allows the existing ruler to evade the succession constraints citizens have sought.
Côte d’Ivoire has also confronted the constitutional reset argument. Alassane Ouattara maintained that the 2016 Constitution restarted the two-term count, allowing another candidacy in 2020; the Constitutional Council approved his eligibility. He secured a fourth term in October 2025, according to the announced provisional results, after leading opponents were excluded from the contest. His supporters point to economic growth and relative stability. Neither achievement settles the democratic objection to disregarding years already served.
These countries and leaders are not identical. Some incumbents retain genuine support, and constitutional amendments can serve legitimate public purposes. Long tenure alone does not establish that every election is fraudulent. But formal legality cannot settle democratic legitimacy when the incumbent’s political machinery can shape the legislature, judicial appointments, electoral administration and access to public media. Citizens need a realistic opportunity to replace those who govern them.
Personal rule can weaken institutions by making advancement depend on loyalty to the president. Ruling parties have less incentive to prepare successors; officials may hesitate to enforce limits against the executive. Presidential relatives and political allies can gain privileged access to state influence. Young citizens then face a system in which national leadership appears permanently reserved for one individual or family.
When peaceful political competition offers little prospect of change, frustration can deepen and succession becomes more dangerous. This does not excuse military intervention. A coup cannot repair democracy by taking away the public’s right to choose. It does expose the weakness of the claim that perpetual presidency guarantees stability: a state built around one person may struggle to manage that person’s departure.
The African Union already has a basis for confronting this problem. Its May 2022 Malabo Declaration reaffirmed constitutionalism, judicial independence and political pluralism, and endorsed the Accra Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government. The Accra process explicitly addressed the manipulation and elimination of constitutional term limits. These commitments should be enforced consistently against civilian manipulation as well as military seizures of power.
Africa needs a continental democratic standard limiting executive presidents to two terms, with no reset for serving incumbents. Amendments extending eligibility should apply only to future officeholders. Succession arrangements must have democratic authorization, and changes of political title must not become a route to indefinite executive power. Independent electoral commissions and courts, free opposition campaigning, equitable public-media access and security forces accountable to constitutional institutions are essential to making those limits meaningful.
Leadership is a temporary public trust. Countries belong to their citizens, including those who oppose the government. A president’s strongest legacy is an institution that can function after departure and a public that can replace its leaders peacefully. Africa cannot defend constitutions against soldiers while accepting their manipulation by presidents. Constitutional engineering that defeats democratic succession must face the same principled scrutiny as any other assault on the people’s right to choose.
